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ABSTRACT
Research conclusions and professional opinion are divided on the predictability
ofnew product success. Studies have been conducted in various industry sectors to
identify the factors that influence the success ofnew product development (NPD)
projects. A study conducted by Cooper & Kleinschmidt [1993] suggested that NPD
success is both predictable and controllable. However, published statistical data on new
product success rates would lead one to believe that success is either not predictable or
that many companies chose not to invest the resources to figure out how to predict and
control the process. Using both quantitative and qualitative research methods, this
author has undertaken an exploratory study on NPD projects at Diamonex Performance
Products Group to see if a model canpredict product suc.cess.
The results of the study described herein suggests that ties exist between
identifiable factors and the success rate ofNPD proJects. Many of the influencing
factors are typically not known at the beginning of a project and therefore the screening
process needs to be continued throughout the development process. Interestingly there
were a numb.er of factors identified that ifnot changed, result in product failure.
Technologies need benefits that are observable and valued by the intended market to
provide products with a relative advantage. The complexity and expense ofthe
technology dictate that there be compelling business reasons to drive the adoption
process. The data analysis has shown that the type of value created by the technology
adoption modifies the set of influencing factors. To create a model that can be
1
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generalized to other technologies a five step process was used to evaluate all types NPD
projects. ,-
The work described here is applied research that lends some additional credence
to the academic theory that new product success is predictable. Understanding the
market forces that playa critical role in the adoption oftechnology will enable
Diamonex to focus on those projects with the highest probability of success. This
research suggests that a screening model can be used to make sharper project-selection
decisions that result in a better corporate focus.
,·············....2..··
. ~ "..
INTRODUCTION
"New product success is predictable; and the profile of a
winner can be used to make sharper project-selection
decisions to yield better focus." Cooper [1997]
The objective of this thesis research is to develop a model to be used to actively
scan the market for diamond coating applications and to filter out new product
development (NPD) projects that lack compelling business reasons to reach
commercialization. To construct a model that can predict the successful adoption of a
technology, what one needs to understand is the diffusion process into the customer's
organization. The psychology ofpurchasing a technology solution from an external
I
source and adopting it into a product has many driving forces and influencing factors.
The driving forces and influencing factors also determine a product success.
This research will lay the ground work for constructing a leaming model to be
developed for managing the project selection process for applications entering the NPD
process. The model will be constructed from expert knowledge and historical project
data. The simple elegance of a learning model is that it will improve with the additional
knowledge gained from each development project. The implementation of the model
.
will enable Diamonex to focus on those applications that provide the most value to our
custom~rs. The model will provide a structure and objectivity to the decision-making
process that will improve the quality and consistency ofproject selection. The
anticipated results will be a more effective new NPD process with greater customer
.,-) -.
satisfaction aild a higher percentage of commercial successes. Efficienc;ies will be
realized through a deeper understanding ofhow the various driving forces and criteria
3
interact and influence the adoption oftechnology and by increasing the communication
between sales managers, technical managers, and other decision-makers.
[Brenner, 1994]
Advantages of a knowledge-based approach to screening new product development
projects include;
1. flexibility in capturing and representing information, knowledge and
managerial judgments;
2. the ability to formally capture and systematize expert knowledge, which can
be more broadly disseminated throughout the organization and become a
source of competitive advantage;
3. enhanced understanding of the decision-making process which can lead to its
improvement;
4. improved organizational understan<!ing and communications, and improved
consistency in decision-making by providing a common platform for many
users at different levels; and
5. compatibility with traditional management science multi-criteria methods.
[Liberatore and Stylianou, 1995]
Assuming there are more new applications than Diamonex's limited resources could
accommodate, a model will help to evaluate and select applications that offer a higher
risk/reward ratio. Applying the same evaluation tool to all projects·consistently and
fairly will add the structure needed to continually improve the process of project
selection. Future research will apply the model to the various gates in the stage-gate
NPD process:
4
Markets are dynamic and the risk/reward ratio for new products may become
unfavorable at some time during the development process. The model can be used to
.get them back on track or to stop the project and redirect resources into projects that are
better fit to the corporate business strategy. Each NPD project that is incorporated into
th~ model will improve the accuracy of the model's ability to predict future applications
which should be considered a living model. Understanding and communicating the
/
benefits of sharing this knowledge will provide a vehicle through which the
organization as a whole can rise to a higher level of competitiveness. Corporations who
can achieve organizational learning will be better equipped to provide the next
generation creative solutions to market needs.
BACKGROUND
Diamond-Like Carbon (DLC) coating technology was chosen for this study
because ofthe amount and richness ofhistorical data available from an eight year old
company. Diamonex is a Unit of the Monsanto Company and the recognized leader in
diamond coating technology worldwide. Diamonex began as a group of scientists in the
Air Products Corporate Science and Technology Center that was spun off as a venture
capital startup company and incorporated in June of 1990. Diamonex begari with no
patents, no existing products and no definite customers when they left Air Products. An
Air Products employee, Phil Winkler had conducted a market analysis for protect~y,¥.'CZgIJ':Umu=...., __
diamond coatings and his report showed high profit margins in the areas of watch
crystals, sun glasses, and optical glasses. Air Products management did not believe
5
Phil's numbers and commissioned Battelle to do a second market study. Battelle came
up with a very similar report to Phil, so Air' Products management went out for a third
opinion. The Technomicsinarket study identified sun glasses, watch crystals, and heat
sinks,"as rich market opportunities for diamond products. The Technomics marketing
study became the basis for the Diamonex business plan, that intentionally left out the
military as a primary customer. This was done because at the time the Venture capital
community was very sensitive to "Start-Ups" that began with military research
contracts and then failed to make the transition into price sensitive commercial
products.
. Diamonex ~LC business strategy was a 5 ~usiness plan and technology
development process (Figure 1) that began with existing technology and ran parallel
product and process development programs. Both the technology development program
and the business development program had incremental goals that were linked to
targeted products.
Figure 1 - Diamonex Original Business Plan
watch crystals sun wear ophthalmic lenses
start small ~1" dia then to ~ '3" dia tinted clear coating on 3" dia. lenses
year 1 year 3 year 5
Time
Jack Galdieri (VP of Sales & Marketing) initiated a business screening process to focus
Diamonex on those projects with the highest probability of success. (Figure 2)
"In 1992 we limited ourselves to those applications that
were mostly 'Pelformance Driven' that is to say DLC in ,
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some way increased the performance of an existing
product: Our focus was somewhat narrow in that respect,
but we needed a focus back then." Joe Wetherington
Figure 2
The Original NPD Application Screen
1. Is there a compelling reason to adopt or buy DLC? - must be a
stronger reason than economics.
2. Technical Feasibility - Can we make it?
3. Siz~ ofthe reward - What is.the customer willing to pay?
Once a Diamonex salesperson had a customer willing to pay totry DLC on their
application then we would run the application through the screen. Frequently we would
take the order even if it failed the screen just to make payroll. (n.b. projects begun prior
to the Monsanto buy-out may not have passed the screen for this reason.) This was
done because the venture capital funding was contingent on Galdieri booking orders.
The number of orders and the total revenue goals were generated by the venture capital
investors to motivate Diamonex. To increase the number of customers or research
grants, Diamonex tried a 'Shotgun' approach for selecting NPD projects.
\
In 1994 Monsanto, then a corporate investor in Diamonex, bought out the
venture capitalists and Air Products. Since then, Monsanto has provided Diamonex
substantial funds to expand and grow the business. In 1995 Diamonex spun out an
Ophthalmics business unit to focus on the large market oppo~ty identified by the
McKinsey study. In 1996 Dave Hoover, President ofDiamonex Performance Products
Group hired Leslie Barkley as the Director ofBusiness Planning. As a former process'
7
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design consultant, she was able to help the Prototype Product Development
. Improvement Team document and understand how Diamonex does NPD and to develop
a better way to manage NPD projects. At the time of this research the majority of the
work has been done to improve the NPD process. Diamonex is attempting to change
their strategy on business growth. Recognizing that a shotgun approach may not be the
best strategy for selecting new>produets, an Eight-Phase Stage-Gate NPD process
(Figure 3) was implemented in 1997 to improve th'e communication between Diamonex
and its customers. The focus ofthis research is to add some clarity to the business
.analysis that normally does notbegin until after phase 4 - Working Prototype
Milestone. Conceptually this analysis should begin in phase 1 with the Consultation.
,
The earlier in the process that applications which are likely to become cpmmercial
failures are identified and stopped, the more effective will be the NPD process at
producing successes.
Figure 3
8-Phase NPD Process
1. Consultation
2. Feasibility of Product Development
3. Product Development
4. Working Prototype Milestone
[BEGIN ANALYZING NPD BUSINESS POTENTIAL]
5. Definition of Product Sp~cification
6. Definition of Manufacturing Process
7. Final Qualification & Pre-Production
8. .Volume Production & Continuous Improvement
9. Equipm.ent Sales and Technology Licensing
Developed for Establishing Customer Expectations, and Internal Resource
Tracking & Allocation
8
The new strategy has many analogies; Dave Hoover likes to call it the 'Bowling
Pin' strategy. Geoffrey Moore, author of Crossing the Chasm, uses a military analogy:
,Attack a niche market and form a base from which to launch future attacks into related
markets.' A Diamonex partner has tried this with some initial success in the cutting
tools industry by targeting graphite machining as the niche market. The partner
company is SP3, which sells the diamond cutting tools, to develop a consumer demand.
The 'demand-pull' created is influencing the technology adoption process by the cutting
tool manufacturers. Once a few companies carry diamond tools, the more conservative
companies will begin to acquire the smaller more technology advance companies in the
diamond cutting tool business.
Changing the way a bunch of entrepreneurs think about marketing technology is
not a trivial task nor one that will happen overnight. Hoover uses words like,
"infection" and "disease""to describe how the proc~ss needs to spread throughout his
organization. To implement the change, Leslie Barkley has been stretching the
organization's thinking. To date Hoover is the only one with the disease and Fred
• .>
Kimock, Director ofTechnology, is close behind with a bad tnfection.
"What needs to happen is that we need to wear down the
subconscious defense mechanisms that all people have
and infect them, but without them Kiiowing' they are "
being infected. And pretty soon, one morning they wake
up with the full blown "disease." Dave Hoover
-9 "
\
•
/In real hinguage the change that needs to occur is a move away from the old
strategy of attacking the market with a shotgun approach, hoping to hit something that
looks like a successful new application for our technology and towards Geoffrey
~
Moore's attacking a niche strategy to obtain a stronghold base from which to launch
future attacks. The new strategy is more focused onthe quality ofNPD execution.
PROPOSITIONS:
1. The greater the need for a technology the higher the probability of adoption.
2. The larger the step change relative to the existing-process technology the less
likely the new technology will be adopted.
3. The magnitude and seriousness of the consequences ofNOT adopting a change
drives the likelihood of adoption
4. The greater the compatibility with existing manufacturing process or existing
product platforms, the more likely the technology will be adopted.
5. The longer the NPD process the less likely the technology will be adopted.
METHODOLOGY
This section addresses the methodology to be used in conducting this study. It is
organized as follows:
1. RESEARCH DESIGN
2. QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
3. DATA COLLECTION METHOD
4. DATA ANALYSIS METHOD
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Using a case study approach, the Diamonex 'Diamond-Like Carbon' coating
technology was studied to identify factors that influence the adoption process. This
technology was chosen for its accessibility and etepth of historical data. Since
Diamonex left Air Products in 1990 there have been several hundred DLC applications
that have passed through the facility in Allentown, PA. A subset of those forty-three
projects was chosen for this study based on a minimum customer funding of $5,000.
Sixteen projects are considered Successful based on having reached the Volume
Production phase with repeat orders. Seven are considered still In-development and will
be excluded from the quantitative data analysis. There are eight NPD projects that are
Technical Failures, and eleven technically successful projects that are Commercial
Failures. Diamonex's success rate for completed projects over $5,000 revenue has
been 44% over the period of this study. A portion of the sixteen commercially
succ'essful products produce little in the way ofprofits for the company and there are
those projects still in development that may never make money. Future studies may use
a differe,nt definition of Success based more on financial returns. (n.b. If all the NPD
projects under $5000 total revenue are includ~d, the success rate drops to well below
10%) This study will attempt to build an understanding of the driving forces that need
to be in place for a DLC NPD to reach commercialization and to understand the value
provided by the technology in terms ofprofit potential. The value created by the
technology as perceived by our customer has been categorized into six categories. In
order of increasing value they are Solve Problem, Problem Avoidance, Consumer Want,
11
categories and the value is not necessarily increasing in order.
Enabling, Competitive Advantage, and New Product. There are projects that overlap
~
Table 1: -Success Rate vs. NPD Project Value.
Solve Problem I Problem I Conslllll"er Enabling
,
CoIIIpetitive,
Avoidance Want Advantage
Successes = 12 Successes = 0 Successes = 0 Successes = 3 . Successes = 2
In-Develop = 4 In-Develop = 0 In-Develop:= I In-Develop ~ 2 In-Develop = 3
Commercial Commercial Commercial Commercial Commercial
Failure = 5 Failure = 0 Failure = 0 Failure = 5 Failure = 3
Technical Technical Technical Technical Technical
Failure = 4 Failure =2 Failure = I Failure = I Failure = 0
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
Account Data Sheets (Appendix A) were completed for each project by the sales
. manager. The.data sheets were completed as part of an internal study conducted by the
Prototype Product Development Improvement Team. The database ofprojects was·
analyzed with Microsoft Access and Microsoft Excel for correlatio~s between
independent variables and the dependent variable project success. For the purposes of
this study a success will be defined as a project that has reached 'Volume Production'
phase of the NPD process and is still 'Active'. Several propositions were created from
the literature and the researcher's own experiences, to be tested quantitatively with the
Account Data Sheets and qualitatively through interviews. The literature reviewed on
.new product development and technology diffusion was used to prepare the initial
model. The baSis for the model is an innovation adoption model by Evert Rogers
12
[1962]. The model attempts to explain the psychology of technology adoption by an
industrial company (Appendix B).
DATA COLLECTION METHOD'
Interviews of the company officers and project team members (Appendix C)
/
were conducted using the Project Value Report as a reference to aid the interviewees in
remembering the projects. Interviews were recorded with a pen and paper to keep the
interviewees more at ease. Immediately following the interview, all notes were typed
into the computer to give the abbreviated notes more depth. The qualitative data will be
used to support or contradict the propositions generated from the literature and the
conclusions from the quantitative data analysis. The interviews were conducted in an
open format [Strauss-& Corbin, 1990] to allow the interviewee latitude to explore
projects they felt strongly about and to flush out the nature ofthe relationships between
the influencing criteria and product success. Interviewees were asked for their opinions
~
on why projects succeeded or failed. Additional questions were asked to explore the·
driving forces that had the strongest influence on technology adoption.
. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS METHOD
Once all the interviews were completed the qualitative data was coded and
grouped by project. Projects were grouped into three types: Technical Failures,
Commercial Failures, and Successes. Each project was then analyzed both with the
quantitative data and all of the qualitative data to make a determination as to the top
13
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three driving forces influencing project success and to identify Red Flags that resulted
in the projects failing to be commercialized. It was assumed that Technical Failure
projects could not succeed commercially, and they were excluded from this analysis. A
second analysis was done of the qualitative data set by coding the data and analyzing
which Driving Forces and Red Flags occurred most frequently in the data set. Those
criteria occurring most often were considered the critical success factors in technology
adoption. Each project was considered while evaluating the propositions generated
after the literature review and quantitative analysis from the Account Data Sheets.
Examples are provided from the interview~ to support those propositions that were
found to hold true. In cases where the relationship between the independent variable
and the dependent variable (project success) was not clear from the research data
analysis, recommendations will be generated for future research. It is the opinion of
this author that a rigorous statistical analysis of the qualitative data set would not add to
the understanding of the relationships between variables or contribute to the
interpretation of the results. During eight years covered by this study (June 1990 - May
1998), Diamonex has grown from a 12 person venture capital spin-off to a 150 person
division of Monsanto and then split into two a 200 person Optical Products Group
(OPG) and a 100 person Performance Products Group (PPG) as units of Monsanto. The
changes both in technology maturity and expanded knowledge base of the employees
make it difficult to compare NPD projects begun in 1990 with those begun in 1997.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
Predicting success for diamond coating applications is dependent on our ability
to model the process of technology adoption (Appendix B). The process of adoption is
the cumulative effect of the diffusion of the technology into our customer's
organization. As the technology benefits diffuse from person to person, each individual
will go through their own adoption process, the sum ofwhich is the organizational
adoption process. Our ability to understand the psychology of change acceptance will
enable us to evaluate if the business reasons are compelling enough to make a product
success. In most markets there are pressures to increase profits by reducing costs.
~""­
Pressures come from competition, from shareholders and from internal sources such as
corporate business objectives. To add process complexIty is to willingly go directly
against the entire market and add cost to your product. For some products and their
managers this is paramount to business suicide. Why then would anyone take such a
risk? There are several reasons, the simplest is there is no other choice. A company
may have a product or process that is so broken and mission critical to the survival of
-
the company that the risk of doing nothing is greater than the risk of changing. To
understand why companies are willing to take on added risk to their operations projects
have been grouped by value to the customer (Table 1). The following five step model
will be used to examine the 'decision to adopt' psychology.
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Figure 4
5-Phase Technology Adoption Process
1. aenefits - 'Understanding the Essence' of the Technology
2.. Matching - Identify Needs / Match Benefits to Needs
3. Testing - the strength ofNeeds
4. Selling - the Customer on the Benefits
5. Acceptance - by the Customer
Developed to Identify Market Opportunities and to
Filter out Projects with Low Probability of Success
Simply stated the Benefits or the essence of diamond coatings are the things that .
add value1to the customer's products, and therefore add value to their organization. The
selling of technology begins with a strong underst.anqing of the benefits. New
technologies require a very creative person to empathize with the potential customers to
convert the material attributes of the technology into benefits. The question iS,what do
I have with the addition ofDLC technology, that I cannot obtain without DLC?
Customers are willing to pay money for the benefits of DLC. Benefits are not material
properties or attributes (Appendix D). Benefits are the result of a problem that is
solved. Benefits are what the customer values in a product. For Example: When a
customer buys a nail to hang'a picture, it is the benefits (cost, mat6rial, compatibility
with existing tools - i.e., hammer) that produce the desired function. The quality of the
..
benefits will result in either continued adoption of this technology or a discontinuance
'" t
and switch to a competing solution. Most consumers have these benefits in mind when
they compare nails to screws to more expensive specialty picture hanging products.
Technology is not sold by the ounce or square foot but by the benefits it
provides the consumer. Diamond-Like Carbon coating customers are usually original·
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) or producers of consumable goods. Not selling to
the end consumer of a product adds a degree of complexity to the marketing of
technology in that we must learn and understand both our customer's needs and their
customer's needs. Industrial customers are very focused on cost containment and
typically steer clear oftechnologies that add cost. The benefits of diamond thin film
coatings will be illustrated with examples to explain the six types of customer value.
Some individual DLC benefits inciude corrosion protection (reactivity), abrasion and
scratch resistance (hardness), UV light filter (optical transparency), electrical resistivity,
cosmetic surface treatment and mechanical stiffness. Different combinations (Appendix
E) of these benefits yield an end value to our customer. Combinations ofthese are what
result in various levels of customer value.
Customizing the benefits to each customer and projecting the benefits to
hypothetical business scenarios will translate the benefits into a language the customer
,
can understand. Communicating th.e unique benefits and superior value that are created
for our customer by the technology is the best way we can be successful at marketing.
The addecfiisk ~sociated with buying a new, perhaps unproven technology from a
small startup technology firm is enough to deter most potential customers from
17
purchasing. Therefore, the value created for our customer has to be significantly greater
than all alternative technologies, available in the very short term, or have no substitutes.
The nature and magnitude of the driving forces that influence our customer's decision
to accept such a perceived large risk are so strong that the cd~cision to adopt cannot be
postponed. Once the problem becomes a crisis, then the diffusion ofDLC happens
quickly into our customer's organization provided that the solution can be developed
quickly to meet the need. The benefit package that t~e adopting organization values in
a technology varies widely, but can be categorized into one of six types (Table 1). In.
order of increasing value to the adopting organization, the most basic and easiest to
identify in the market place is typed Solve Problem. In this case the customer has an
existing problem with a product or process and has approached Diamonex to develop a
solution to this problem. The second type ofbenefit is a Cost Avoidance. These are
projects where a potential problem has such large penalties that the customer
organization must change to minimize the likelihood of the problem occurring.
Penalties re~ult from such things as work related illnesses, lawsuits, governmental fines
or competition driving you out ofbusiness. The third type ofbenefit is a Consumer
Want, which has been identified and is a large market opportunity if a solution can be
, -..2'
found. If the market demand is strong enough a Want to Have product becomes a Need
to Have product with a significant financial reward to drive the development of a need
filling product. A McKinsey marketing study done for Monsanto in 1994 following the
Diamonex buyout was the driving force for the dev~lopment ofthe Diamonex Lens.
18
The study identified an enormous unmet need in the ophthalmic lens business for a light
weight, scratch resistant and shatter proof lens.
"It was the study and the overwhelming enthusiasm that
McKinsey had for the ophthalmic lens product that got
Monsanto to take a risk in the Diamonex OPG facility
which was very foreign to their core capability. ....
",
If it was not for McKinsey, Monsanto would never have
done it." Hill Williams
The fourth type ofbenefit is termed Enabling, when a new product can not exist
without the material attributes of diamond coatings and no other existing.technology
can provide the same enabling benefits. The fifth type ofbenefit is a Competitive
Advantage. In some way DLC has provided our customer with superior performance,
product differentiation, or reduced cost of goods sold that gives them an advantage over
their competition. The sixth type ofbenefit is a New Product. In this case the
technology has created an entirely new product that will result in significant new
business opportunities for the customer's organization. In some DLC applications the
benefit package falls into more than one of these six categories. In those cases it is wise
to consider all of the benefits when marketing the application. Table 1 lists the projects
in the category they were assigned it}. the quantitative data collection.
'Solve Problem' applications are the J;l1ost common ofthe DLC value types and
typically require the small~st stepc~ange by the adopter.__ Company-A is one of the top
competitors in the Data Storage industry who supplies tape heads to a number of tape
drive manufacturers. The data storage industry i~ very competitive with both alternative
19
storage devices as well as price and quality product differentiation. In 1990 a number
of Company-A's customers began complaining ofhead failures and poor durability and
threatened to go to other vendors for their tape heads. The complaints motivated
Company-A to begin a two year development program with Diamonex to apply DLC to
their tape heads to extend the life expectancy of the heads. The benefit Gompany-A
was hoping to get out of the coating was a solution to their unhappy customer problem.
The super material properties of diamond, the corrosion protection, the low coefficient
of friction or slipperiness and the hardness or abrasion resistance would in theory slow
the degradation of the heads from the rubbing ofthe passing metal oxide tape.
Diamonex received all their information about the nature of the problem and the results
of the testing from Company-A. In hin~sight, to apply learning to our model, a more
objective understanding of the problem might have led us to believe that not even
diamond coatings would give enough abrasion protection for this application and the
~
project could have bee~ stopped. In this case the timing ofthe project with the
..
company development probably would have ov~rridden the model's recommendation.
After an unsuccessful attempt to coat Inductive heads the technology eventually had
success in an application on MR heads. The ability to be at the right place when the
problem hits has more to do with being active in the market than spending time in the
lab.
"... you can not remove yourself from the markets and run
scenarios through a model until you find an application
that fits with the company strategy. Instead you need to
get involved with the market, jump in and explore, poke
around and commU11icate (two ways) with the market
20
(customers) until you find the right application."
Dave Hoover - (Probe Theory on project selection)
On~ interviewee who worked on the development of this project commented
that the coating was a technical success as measured by the customer's specifications to
"
obtain adh~$ion to the part, with uniform thickness and without affecting the
performam~e of the head's ability to read stored data on a magnetic tape. What is
interesting i$ that the coating did solve a problem Company-A had in that it prevented
inventory loSS due to corrosion. It was the opinion ofthis interviewee that Company-A
may still b~ using the coating to protect their head inventory prior to initial drive usage.
Perhaps th~ industry will move entirely away from Tape Drives to a more reliable and
eCOnOmi~ution like read-writable CD ROM Drives. At the time ofthis paper the
popular dat~ storage device for PCs was 100MB ZIP drive which run about $100 plus
,$20 per cattfidge. .
'Co;tAvoidance' value to a customer is a problem that has to be avoided. Flat
bed bar-code scanner windows are an example of a project that began as a Solve .
Problem but which also has a Cost Avoidance driving force. The project was part of an
internal COrJ1panyresearch project to develop a replacement for a $150 sapphire
-
laminated Window with a coated window of equal scratch resistance at a cost of $20 per
window. A plain glass scanner window would cost about $3 with $1 of that the actual
substrate ~lass. The driving force that is now pulling the diffusion ~fDLC coated
. scanner WiOdow into the market is a cost avoidance. Check out clerks that scan
groceries over flat bed bar-code scanners are experiencing work related ~llnesses from
21
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repetitive motion know as carpal-tunnel syndrome. The theory is that the illness is
exacerbated when the clerk must swipe an item over the scanner window multiple times
because the window is scratched and the scanner can not read the bar-code. Plain glass
windows at an average grocery store last approximately two weeks.. Market studies and
lab tests estimate that DLC scanner windows will last up to seven years (Appendix F)
and are being marketed with a life-time warranty. DLCis rapidly diffusing into this
market even as alternative solutions such as hand-held scanners enter the market.
'Consumer Want' value projects have a strong appeal to manufacturers in that
the commercial viability of the product is not a question. The Diamonex Polycarbonate
Ophthalmic Lens is the result of an extensive marketing study done by McKinsey in
1994 for Monsanto. It identified a huge market opportunity to meet a market need for
scratch resistant light-weight eyewear. In every market study the top three complaints.
!
about eyewear were 1)screw retention, 2) lens scratches and 3) weight of the glasses.
This is a case where the end consumer has a clearly defined need and a diamond coating
on top ofthe appropriate substrate lens material provides a unique set ofbenefits and a
superior value to the consumer. To drive the adoption ofthis product Diamonex has
done extensive market testing on different kinds of consumer advertising media (TV,
Radio, and Print) and has implemented a distribution charuiel strategy that provides
every step in the chain with monetary incentive to promote this product.
,.
'Enabling' value projects are a collision ofmultiple technologies that produce a
new product. The extra value that makes these projects Enabling projects comes from
C'
the product's dependence on the benefits ofDLC for its existence. The benefit ofDLC
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on MR heads is significant in that MR heads as data storage components could not exist·
without DLC. The heads are made out of a material that is highly susceptible to
corrosion.. There are other inert coatings that could provide th~enabling benefits of
corrosion resistance but those coatings do not have the low friction of DLC. The
competing technologies rub off quickly and corrosion destroys the head. Therefore it IS
the combine benefits of corrosion protection and low friction that enables this product
. .
platform to exist.
"DLC on MR heads has enabled the distance between the
head and the spinning disk (lO,OOOrpm) to be reduced to
100-150 angstroms and thereby increasing the data storage
density by lOOx. Today's DLC coated HDD can store up
to 9 Gigabytes on a single disk drive, while preventing
head crashes. A head crash is when the MR head lands on
the spinning disk and if it does not bounce back up the
disk stops spinning and most of the data is lost. The
analogy would be to have a 747 jet fly a few inches ofthe
ground at 600mph and if it collided With the ground
temporarily it would not crash. This could not happen
without the very hard, low friction DLC coating."
Leslie Barkley
There are two driving forces pulling the adoption of MR heads over alternative
data storage devices. The first is a market trend for more storage (Gigabytes) per device
and lower cost per Gigabyte. The second driving force is competition in the industry.
IBM had already developed a DLC coated MR head and all those companies competing
.---c--...,.--,---:----~ .------.-
with the older technology paradigm would have found themselves left behind. The
storage density capable with MR head technology is an order ofmagnitude higher than
competing technologies. This means that IBM. could offer an8 Gigabyte hard disk
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drive for the same price as Company-B would have to charge for an 800 Megabyte hard
disk drive had Company-B refused to adopt the technology. That or everyone would
have to buy their MR heads from IBM for use in their data storage devices.
'Competitive Advantage' value projects tend to be adopted the fastest. In some
coating applications the DLC benefits include cosmetic characteristics that provide
existing products with the ability to be differentiated and capture price premiums. In
the Company-C case the competition for market share is done with new club design and
-
heavy advertising with professional endorsements. The problem with a differentiation
strategy is that six months after a new club design is launched there are knock-off
copies of the design flooding the market from Asia that are assembled in the United
States and sold for a fraction of the price. DLC coated golf clubs can be argued to
provide no measurable performance enhancement. What it does provide is the ability to
differentiate the club long term and maintain a competitive advantage through patent
protection and trade secrets behind the coating technology. Differentiation is achieved
because DLC is one of the four available shiny black "ceramic" coatings on the market
that will never tarnish or rub off. Some may argue that golfers will perform better with
attractive clubs that give them confidence. There is also the "snob" factor that identifies
people as successful because they can afford what is commonly known to be a very·
expensive golfclub. (DLC coated Company-D putters are priced at $600 for a Japan
~~ .._----
launch in 1998)
'New Product' value has the largest impact on long term business growth for
Diamonex customers. Diamond heat spreaders are a very expensive solution to a
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thermal managem~nt problem. Diamond heat spreaders are not a DLC product but are
discussed here for illustration ofNew Product value. As traditional thermal
management solutions can no longer solve evolvingthermal management problems,
then diamond value reaches the top level ofNew Product. Heat spreaders for LEDs to
be used in traffic lights are a very new product to address an old problem. Traffic lights
that use incandescent bulbs last only a couple months and cause significant traffic jams
and sometimes accidents when they burn out. The application of an array of small
LEDs in place ofbulbs works out to have an order of magnitude performance to cost
ratio over the existing technology. LEDs consume much less power, are about twice as
bright, and last 10-20 times longer if cooled with diamond heat spreaders. This is a
benefit package that appears in many products where the rate of diffusion will be
limited by the cost of the diamond (Appendix D).
. .
Matching benefits to customer needs is the second phase in the Technology
Adoption Model (Appendix B). Successful NPD projects are the result of a good fit or
matching of technology benefits to customer needs. The adoption of a: new technology
is a change process that has inertia heavily weighted against the technology diffusing
into the customer's organization. Companies have personalities similar to people; they
are iDherently risk averse and reluctant to change. To overcome this inertia se~eral
. .
things need to happen simultaneously. The most important ofwhich is that the
-~---------------
technology meets or exceeds the customer's needs at an affordable cost. New materials
usually have 'Inter-material' competition with existing products that are already fillinK
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the need if only partially. Adoption will come down to the performance/price ratio or
relative advantage of the new product over the old.
"Understanding user needs is absolutely critical to
successful technology commercialization ofboth -
invention and innovation." Leonard-Barton [1994]
After the Need is clearly articulated and communicated can a determination be made
about whether or not a particular technology can provide the superior value to drive the
solution through the adoption process. The process of adopting a high risk new
technology has to happen quickly and with surmountable opposition. It may take just
one person with decision making power to KILL a project. Correctly understanding the
customer's need enables the solution provider to present the unique benefits in a manor
and language that the adopter can understand and communicate internally to all
members in the decision-making chain. Without this word ofmouth communication of
the benefits, the new application will not likely overcome the inertia of change.
The ability to identify a Need that is suitable to DLC benefits will improve the
project success rate. NPD projects begin either when a customer approaches Diamonex
with a suitable Need or when Diamonex approaches a customer with a valuable
business opportunity. Using published literature, expert knowledge and past
experiences, a model can be created to identify the best suited applications for a
technology. History has taught us that the risk of adopting a new technology from a
relatively new comp~y is so great that it will take a crisis to drive the adoption.
Geoffrey Moore terms the gap between the Visionaries and the Pragmatists as the
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chasm. Moore's theory discusses the diffusion of a new product into a market, but we
can use the same theory to describe how a technology diffuses into a customer's ""'
organization. The Visionaries are people who can see where the company needs to be
and understand technology's role in creating new products to get to the goal. The
Pragmatists are management types that need more convincing than a technical
feasibility study. These people are responsible for the company's bottom line and need
to understand the benefits as they relate to business growth or cost reduction.
Figure 5
The Chasm Moore, 1995
....
The better a DLC project champion is able to communicate the benefits of the
application the mor~ likely the application will reach commercialization. Once the
product is commercialized, the importance ofthe unique benefits and superiofvalue to
the consumer are what will decide the commercial success of the product. The high
.'..II l."\7't·,.,..>
level of complexity and all the hidden costs associated with DLC adoption causes a
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natural bias against adopting to an existing products or manufacturing process. This
bias is referred to as the inertia of change. This may not be true for new products.
The diffusion oftechnology into an organization is a slow process of learning
the benefits, reaching a comfort level with the risk and making a decision to adopt or
reject. Each person in the decision chain will make their own decision to adopt the
technology based on a process like the one described by Rogers [1962]. The first phase
is 'Knowledge' of the technology application. This is when each person first becomes
aware th~t DLC is being considered by their organization as a possible solution to a
problem. The second phase is the 'Persuasion' where the person weighs opposing
influencing factors and forms an opinion about DLC as a viable solution. In the
'Decision' phase the individual engages in the mental process ofweighing the pros and
cons of the technology and a choice is made to either adopt or reject. The
implementation occurs after the adopting organization has come to a group decision.
Following the product launch, feedback to the adopter gives 'Confirmation' and a
decision is made to continue or discontinue the adopti?n.
The methods of communication internal to the customer organization have a
large influence on how well the benefits are understood all the way up the 'decision
~hain.Typically, it takes one person to vote 'No' to kill a new technology adoption
-project. Obtaining the appropriate internal project champion is critical to the diffusion
process within the'customer's organization. Picking the right person to champion a new
._,_: ?r'r.1 ~~f7.i:-=--7"':!:t.'Uo -
DLC application involves an understanding ofwhat motivates Engineers and Scientists,
Sales and Marketing, and the people with signing authority. What is important to the
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Engineer is that his problem has been solved by tJIe technology. The scientist is
concerned with the super material properties·a.l1~ the knowledge that comes with the
b
application. The Sales and -Marketing people d<J pot care at all about the technical
performance characteristics unless they create -v~Jue that can be used to differentiate
their product. The company leaders are interest~J in the long term ramifications in
terms of risk management of adopting a new tec)y1010gy. Will it provide competitive
advantage and put the company in a leadership tJositioll to set the pace of new product
innovations in their industry? The accountants ¥ill want to model the effect on the
bottom line and future profitability of the comp¥Y or business unit. An example where
diamond coatings has a positive performance bft1eflt to an existing product, but a
negative affect on the bottom line ofthe distrib1ttt'r, is diamond cutting tools. In this
application a diamond cutting tool will last 10" lOllger than the next best on the market,
but because of the price elasticity of demand in we market the manufacturer can only
charge twice the cost of the next best. Even thO~~h the profit margin has gone up 2x
per part, the volume will decrease by lOx so thtlt -the actual revenue decreases by 5x.
There lies the irony ofbuilding something that l~ts too long. Another force against the
adoption of life-extending technology is that m()/ift lnanagers and executives are
measured on short-term performance and chan~~jqbs every few years. Few of them are
willing tp spend more now to save money later i\fter they have left the company. This
-----------------~'/--~--'----
phenomenon is primarily in the United States, tlltJIough the rest of the world is
becoming more iike corporate America as econ<J:t1!ies merge through globalization.
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The greater the need for a technology the higher the probability of adoption.
(Proposition #1) The longer the NPD process the less likely the technology will get
.adopted. (Proposition #5) Relating these two propositions together we can conclude
that the weaker the need for a new technology the longer will be its development and .
the more likely it will fall. Or conversely, the stronger the need the shorter the
development will have to be for the project to succeed. Knowing the influe~ce that the
strength of a need has, logic will dictate that a supplier of technology solutions would
develop an ability to measure the strength of a Need. Historically, Diamonex has tried
to charged its customers for the majority ofNPD projects for two reasons. One to keep
cash flow positive, and second to test the strength of the customer's need for the
technology by their willingness to pay for the development of the solution. This
strategy has a third benefit in that diamond coatings may satisfy the customer's
expectations, but turn out to be the wrong technology for the application. Diamonex
does not want to lose money on each project that meets customer's specifications but
fails to commercialize. Company-E is a great example of this. The customer knew
exactly what they wanted (DLC coated femoral heads); Diamonex provided the
technology which did not solve the problem because, DLC turned out to be
incompatible with the High Density Polyethylene hip socket and the project was a
technical failure.
--- -._---- ----
"... their threshold for pain." - Ed Thear
..~,: r::.?T..tiP'
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Testing the customer's fortitude for change can be a tough thingto,measur~.
Depending on the strength of the need and the degr~e ofurgency with which a solution
is either expected or needed, a customer mayor may 'not have the fortitude to commit to
a development program. Adopting a technology that is relatively sophisticated into an
existing product or manufacturing process may require significant infra-structure
change and financial investment on the part of the customer organization. Identifying a
customer's ability and fortitude to make these changes and their commitment to fund the
project development is something that can and should be done early on in the
development process.
It is better to stop a weak project early in the development rather than allow it to
reach production, and then learn that there are no compelling business reasons to launch
the product. New Product Development costs grow exponentially as projects near their
commerCiallaWlch. The ability to screen out projects with poofstrategic fit initially
and to KILL projects that made the initial screen but later failed to meet the minimum
requirements for GO/KILL decision points in the'NPD process (Figure 3) will increase
the resources available to work on projects thought to have better possibilities for
success. Companies that are not able to KILL a bad project will end up spending
significant time and money on dead end projects that could have been used to produce
the next big money maker. There are several negative ramifications from allowing a
development project to continue on long after it should have been stopped Clue to
strategic business or technical reasons. The first and most obvious reason is to save
··iiioiieY~"'Tntsecoi:ld less obvious"but'more important reason is to prevent your.technicat"u.,
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people from stagnating on dead end research projects. Companies are by definition the
sum total of their employees' knowledge and output. To let a talented scientist or
engineer waste months or years of their life on a project with little possibility for
commercialization will cost the company in time, employee turn-over and morale. ~ •
." .
These losses fall under the economic theory of opportunity costs.
After the initial market screen is done and a project enters the NPD process, it
will be necessary to continue to collect information to answer the model's questions that
..
.could not be answered initially. It will also be wise to test the theory about the
application at the decision gates. All NPD projects should proceed slowly until such
point as the strength of the need can be measured. Many ofthe questions asked in the
market screen will be asked again at each gate in the development process. As the new
application moves through each successive stage of its development, more and more
information will be available and the gate questions will be easier to answer. The
original bar-code scanner window development project is a good example. What if
after two years of development work the project reached the decision gate to launch into
full production phase, but there had been a change in the market need? Suppose those
grocery stores and other users of flatbed bar-code scanners were all moving to hand
held scanners. Would it make sense to spend 75% of the total development cost to scale
up a production line that was quickly becoming extinct? Or would it be wiser to invest
that money into amore competitive new product application? This is why many
companies ~e focused on increasing the speed of new product development. All
markets are dynamic, and if there truly is an unmet need that could result in large
~
..
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financial rewards for the company who answers the need, more than one company will
be working on the solution. Consequently, being first to market may be more important
than getting to market with the best solution. -Applying speed wholesale to all types of
new product development projects can lead to poor decision making, poor quality
products, and market failure. [Collette, 1991] Is communication the tool to get a
company to adopt our technology and quickly?
Communication of benefits to customers influences the rate of adoption. The
better articulated the benefits the faster the diffusion through the customer's adoption
process. Communicating the benefits of technology to a non-technical person in the
decision chain is an art. It takes an ability to gain an understapding of the customer's
need and from there convert the technology's attributes into a package ofunique
benefits that offer superior value. The psychology of selling by word ofmouth
promotion leverages the existing channels of communication within the customer
organization. Depending on the amount of interaction between Diamonex and the
customer's decision chain, it is extremely important to communicate to the internal
champion the benefits in terms that can be understood by everyone in the chain.
. Educating the champion will involve learning the informal decision chain and who the
players are that influence the decision process and arming the champion with
information about benefits that are valued by his organization.
Agreement on the nature of the customer's need for DLC must happen for a
NPD to reach commercialization. An example where this did not happen sufficiently
was the 'Company-E -Femoral Head' project. The customer communicated a need to
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develop a low friction diamond coating on hip stems to extend the life o~hip
replacements past the 20 year average. What the customer really needed was a coating
with very low contact angle to enable the body's fluids to lubricate the joint. The
driving force to adopt DLC was a competitive threat that had announced an intended
new product line of DLC coated replacement joints. After three years of development
and an unsuccessful feasibility study, it was determined that DLC coatings were not the
solution to the problem. A fundamental lack of understanding on how DLC would
provide the benefits to meet the need resulted in a technically successful diamond
coated femoral head that would shorten the- expected life of a hip replacement to only a
few years because of a material incompatibility between DLC, serum-and high density
polyethylene (hip socket). What Company-E needed was a coating with a high contact
angle that would hold-the saline on the hip ball as a lubricant. DLC has a very high
contact angle that results in no lubrication and dry hard DLC rubbing on dry soft
polyethylene that is abraded making the hip socket wear out faster. The optimum
solution to the problem turned out to be a ceramic material with a low contact angle
which is already in Company-E's product p?rtfolio. Company-E and their competition
spent a lot of time and money developing the wrong technology for the application. In
one interview the situation was described as though Company-E did not want the
project to succeed. Company-E already had the best technical solution to the problem
and what they really wanted was scientific evidence that DLC was not also an answer.
The data was in fact to be used to discredit their competitor's new product line launch.
,_ __ Jfthi~Lw~jJlJa,qtwhy.thecustomer.contractedtheresearch,-then,they did-get the value
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they wanted. However, Diamonex spent considerable time and effort for what
amounted to a small amount of short-term revenue and a nominal advancement of the
technology.
Alternative solutions to a customer's problem will and should be tested prior to
beginning a NPD project. One of the larger DLC development programs Diamonex did
for Monsanto was an application for a molten plastic release coating on the front surface
of spinerettes. A spinerette is an extrusion die used in the continuous process to make
carpet fibers. The problem Monsanto had with their spinerette~ was a phenomenon
called "die drool." The problem was an issue of costs incurred from equipment
downtime to clean the spinerettes. Through the DLC development process, Monsanto
made some changes to the way they did maintenance to their spinerettes. These revised
procedures had enough of a positive affect on the equipment up time that the economics
of adopting DLC ceased to provide suffici~nt price/performance benefits and the project
was discontinued. The standard method of cleaning the spinerettes was to heat them to
bum off the residual polymers, but this process also removed our coating. The
spinerette project led to the development ofa high temperature DLC.
Selling technology involves convincing the customer that the benefIts out weigh
the costs. Industrial customers are under great pressure from the market, their
shareholders, and corporate management to decrease costs. It ispreferable to delay the
decision to make a change as long as possible. Company-C is an example of a market
opportunity that was identified by Diamonex who contacted the, customer with a
possible solution to their problem. Brand name sporting goods manufacturers lose
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market share to 'knock off' copies of their products that are made in the Far East and
sold in America under similar but slightly different names and at a fraction of the price.
Loss ofmarket share is killing the profitability ofthese name brand products. DLC
coating provides a cosmetic benefit that can not easily be duplicated because of the
capital intensive equipment required to make the coating and the patent protection on
the application. The value of a coating that can not be copied is captured by a long term
competitive advantage from successful product differentiation. The project with
Company-C has led to a project with Company-D a wholly owned subsidiary of
Company-C, who needs a top of the line putter to compete with Titlest's Scotty
Cameron ($275). The Scotty Cameron has a shiny black coating, but it rubs off in a
year or two depending on the amount of abuse. Right now both Company-G and
Company-D are paying per club, but will be given the flexibility to launch into full
production with either Toll-Coating, or through the sale of a turnkey on-site coating
facility. Reducing the risk to a customer by offering choices in how to adopt the
technology can help balance the equation in favor of adopting DLC. Costs of adopting
a new technology vary significantly depending on how the technology is purchased.
There can be large hidden costs buried in things like the need to hire technical people,
the need to purchase high tech equipment, or simple soft costs like making adjustments
to an existing production line.
_ ~. __~._ ••~_.~_'" •• _.__ •• .~ • • ., __• _. ~~_ ..... • --._-• •"r:-,.-tr.1'l":J>'
.Customer Acceptance is a good yard stick to measure how well the benefits
match the need and how well that information has been communicated within the
customer's organization. The faster our customer adopts DLC into their application the
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better we did at selling the benefits. A good example of a project that took longer than
.
expected despite external driving forces was scanner windows for Company-F. The
adoption ofDLC coated windows into flat bed bar-code scanners was heavily
influenced by a corporate objective to control manufacturing costs. Despite competitive
pressures, the project was held up from reaching full production because Company-F
did not want to add a new production line for the new scanner window. The additional
step in the manufacturing process was not compatible with their existing process and
added significant soft costs. To eliminate this shipping and assembly cost for
Company-F, Diamonex submitted a proposal to do the assembly of the scanner tops in
Allentown. This flexibility has resulted in a larger profit margin for Diamonex and a
whole product solution for Company-F.
As the technology diffuses into the customer organization, the amount of contact
that Diamonex has with each additional level in the decision chain is limited. Assuming
some loss ofbenefit communication will happen in theChain, it will be critical to
communicate as clearly as possible the organizational benefits to every person in
contact with DiamQnex to help the buyer (internal champion) sell to his management.
Typically in a NPD project a Diamonex salesperson will be contacted by an Engineer or
Scientist with either a problem or an idea for an opportunity. As the application makes,
its way through the development process, more and more funding is required to take the
project tQ the next phase in the stage-gate model. As a NPD project diffuses up the
corporate ladder, at each.new level in the process the project champion will need to be
able to articulate the benefits ofthe project to his superiors in terms ofvalue created for
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the organization. For example, the project champion at Company-C will need to sell his
management on the concept that DLC can provide their product with long term
competitive advantage through patent protection from 'knock offs.' One would imagine
that this is a very sensitive subject with upper management at Company-C and the sale
would be easy. The difficulty will come from management's lack of technological
sophistication and what might be a low threshold for risk.
A customer's risk tolerance can be evaluated somewhat with market research.
Knowledge of the market in which the company competes and what they use to
differentiate their product can give a good idea as to the customer's risk tolerance.
From an organizational perspective there is a lot ofuncertainty involved in
implementing an outsider's technology that is not initially, and may never be fully,
understood or controllable. Risk minimization can be accomplished in a number of
ways including Toll-coating and contracting technical service. Diamonex tried very
hard to sell technology to a sunglasses assembler. Company-G sells sunwear based on
fashion and heavy adyertising with sexy people. The risk that Company-G had to
assume to adopt DLC as a performance enhancing coating was mitigated by
Diamonex's ability to offer Toll-coating so that Company-G would not have to learn the
technology nor purchase the equipment. More importantly, Company-G's production
lines would remain unchanged. Company-G's core competency is marketing.
Everything else is farmed out to lens manufacturers and companies like Diamonex who
.,
apply decorative or scratch resistant coatings. This strategy of risk minimizationis
done because ofthe nature of a fashion driven market that changes annually. For a
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company like Company-G to commit to adopting a technology .in-house lik~DLC,
''which could take years to perfect, would be to assume huge risk that the market studies
that showed a strong intention to purchase the product would continue unchanged for a
sufficient period to cover the investment.
The size of the investment to adopt DLC into a product should not be a reason
that a project is canceled by our customer. Financial information about a customer's
ability to purchase the technology should be known before any development work is
ever started. Many companies have financial hurdle rates for new products measured in
return on investment (ROI), net present value (NPV), or an internal rate of return (IRR)
that have to be met for project approval. The cost to adopt a technology such as DLC
coating includes both the up-front costs such as hardware and new hires, but also hidden
costs of changing a product. Hidden costs include; increased SKUs, new packaging,
advertising, additional storage, inventory, and all the changes to their existing
manufacturing process. Adopting a paradigm-shifting technology is rarely a seamless
process.
The data analysis section will try to relate the size of the problem, opportunity
and Need, to the success rate ofNPD projects. Considering the original Diamonex
market screen and the literature review, the driving force to adopt has to be an
enonTIous market opportunity or a problem that threatens or substantiaIly benefits the
business for a company to take on the risk involvedin adopting a technology that is not
within their core competency. Companies that sell technology will have to be
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increasingly flexible when it comes to the vehicle by which the benefits are delivered to
~
the customer.
DATA ANALYSIS
The Account Data Sheets (Appendix A) were designed by the Prototype Product
Development Improvement Team with a goal to improve the NPD process. Initial data
analysis by the team, indicated that the information on the form was incomplete for its
intended use. Some missing information on the original data sheets was added through
this research effort. The following summary (Table 2) analyses the data relating to the
topic of this study.
Table 2 - Quantitative Data Summary
Variable Condition Success rate
--- ---- -----
Value Competitive Advantage- ·33%
Enabling 43%
Solve Problem 50%
Customer Specifications Complete 64%
Partial 14%
Qualified Process YES 75%
NO 29%
Qualified Product YES 100%
NO 33%
How Contacted Customer>Diamonex 42%
Diamonex > Customer 63%
Other 0%
Champion Customer Department 13%
Customer Individual 60%
Customer Organization 30%
Diamonex 86%
Strategy Diamonex Product 86%
Process Licensing 33%
R&D 0%
Toll Coating 36%
Market Analysis YES 50%
NO 42%
.~" _ .. _-
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Proposition #1 - The greater the need for a technology the higher the probability of
adoption.
The degree to which a need is understood by an organization may be an
indicator of the strength ofthat need and how much time has been spent in finding a
solution. In Table 2 the correlation between 'Complete Customer Specifications,' in
terms of desired performance characteristics and benefits, and success (64%) is more
than four times the correlation between 'Partial Customer Specifications' and success
(14%). The depth ofurlderstanding that a customer has ofhis need and a potential
solution is an indicator of strength of the need. Any problem not worthy of an intense
analysis and extensive search for a solution can probably be ignored and will not drive
the adoption for DLC coating. Another indicator of the strength of a need is whom the
company assigns to the position ofproject champion. In Table 2 the worst success rate
was for projects that were championed by a department (13%) within the customer's
organization. No one person is responsible which causes confusion leading to a
situation where the entire organization is not behind the project. That scenario is a
recipe for a difficult diffusion. A project has a much better chance of succeeding if an
individual is the champion (60%). Not quite as good is the case where the entire
customer organization is championing the project (30%). A closer look at the projects
in this category that were not successful revealed four technical failures and two
projects where the customer bought the same technology from another vendor in a
country where Diamonex does not have patent protection. With such a small data set
(nine projects) it is difficult to say that it is better to have an individual as a projecf
.-~ - - . - - -- -
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champion over the entire customer organization. The six projects that failed to
commercialize in the category of 'Customer Organization' can all be justified by
another driving force. Interestingly, those projects where the champion was Diamonex
had an 86% success rate." This correlation is difficult to make because the individuals
who were responsible for filling out the Account Data Sheets (Appendix A) were the
champions and not likely to take credit for too many failed projects.
Proposition #2 - The larger the step change relative to the existing process
technology the less likely the new technology will be adopted.
The probability of adoption is related to the perceived benefits of the customer
and the degree of change that is required to achieve those benefits. However, the value
of the benefits to a customer is independent to the size of the step change that is
required to achieve those benefits. The number ofprojects in the Solve Problem value
category indicate that those projects have the lowest step change or risk to the adopting
company. (Table 1) That is to say that risk increases with the size of the change and
the strength of the driving forces must rise an equivalent amount for adoption to occur.
Solve Problem proje~ts had a 50% success ~ate. Enabling projects that provide a higher
level of value to a product than Solve Problem projects had a 43% success rate. The
highest ranked category according to the value to the customer with a completed project
was Competitive Advantage that had a 33% success rate. The Problem Avoidance,
Consumer Want and New Product did not have enou.gh completed projects to make a
correlation with succ"ess. --The results of the quantitative data analysis (Table 2) support
Proposition #2. The larger the step from where a company or consumer is to where
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they need to be to adopt DLC the less likely is the adoption. That is to say that as risk
increases with the size of the step change, the strength ofthe driving forces must rise an
equivalent amount.
Proposition #3 - The magnitude and seriousness of the consequences of NOT
adopting a change drives the likelihood of adoption.
This proposition is the,inverse ofproposition #1 and has significance to the
Problem Avoidance'category ofbenefit value. Projects, where a potential or existing
problems that ifnot solved result in organizational failure, have the driving force to
diffuse any size step change. The quantitative data set did not contain any information
that directly supports this proposition. A few comments were made in the memo field
on the data sheet that asked, 'Were there alternative options for the customer?' No
alternatives give our customers no choice but to adopt. These comments were explored
and will be supported by comments made during the qualitative data collection.
Proposition #4 - The greater the compatibility with existing manufacturing process
or existing product platforms, the more likely the technology will
be adopted.
The less change a company will have to make to existing production lines and
logistics support ofmanufacturing, the cheaper and easier the technology will be
adopt~d. In the quantitative data analysis we see that the more risk Diamonex can
assume the higher the success rate. Equipment sales and technology licensing have, the
highest amount of required infrastructure change and the lowest success rate (33%).
When Diamonex keeps the DLC coating process in house and the customer assembles
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the finished product the success rate goes up slightly (Toll Coating = 36%). Products
that are done entirely in house have virtually no compatibility issues with the customer
and have the highest success rate (Diamonex Product = 86%). The proposition would
appear to hold true, but the quantitative data does not make a strong case. Results are
summarized in Table 2 of the detailed quantitative analysis.
Pr,pposition #5 - The longer the NPD process the less likely the technology will be
adopted.
The strength of the driving fOFces required for a successful technology adoption
have by nature a timing element. It takes a problem so bad and mission critical to their
- - - ~ -
organization that they are willing to make the leap to a new technology paradigm, it is
reasonable to conclude that they need the solution to the problem right away.
Customers who can afford six months to six years to develop a solution do not have a .
mission critical problem. These companies are either visionary companies with large
market opportunities in mind or companies with intellectual curiosity and a large R&D
budget. Examining the Account Data, an assumption can be made that those projects
which had an existing Qualified Proc~ss had a shorter development process. We see
that (QualifiedProcess=YES) had a 75% success rate, which is considerably higher than
for those applications that required a process to be developed (Qualified Process=NO)
which had a 29% SUCGess rate. The cases where QualifiedProduct=YES are identical
in the NPD pipeline. Cases like Japanese and European wear resist~Lglass customers
are identical applications to existing products, but the customers are what Rogers would
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call the Late Majority or Laggards. [Rogers, 1962] These companies will not buy the
product even with a life-time warranty until they have tested a sample order for ten
years or until the entire industry accepts the technology as the standard.
The top three driving forces for successful DLC applications as coded from the
qualitative research data are Competition, Solve Problem and Consumer Demand.
Competition is the engine of capitalism and it logically motivates companies to take
risks either to defend marketshare or to attack to gain marketshare. Competition can be
real or perceived with identical influencing effects on a company considering adopting a
new technology. In the qualitative data coding Competition was the sum of responses
coded as Competitive Threats and those applications where the adopter was on the
offensive trying to gain a Competitive Advantage. The benefits ofDLC as an addition
to an existing product is most frequently performance enhancing product attributes.
The value realized by the product manufacturer is the ability to differentiate their
I
product from the competition with increased product performance. This agrees with
Cooper's [1993] number one criteria for determining new product success which is a
product that delivers unique benefits and superior value to the consumer.
The second most popular driving force in the qualitative data set was Solve
Problem. A customer has a problem that can not be ignored or solved with traditional
technologies, and the problem is mission critical to t~e_~uccess of the company, has the
motivation to make a technology adoption. Such a problems can make a customer leap
onto a new technology paradigm such as DLC coatings. The more risky the adoption
the more important the problem must be to drive the adoption. This supports
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proposition #3 and leads into a new proposition for future study on the timing ofNPD
projects.
Further analysis reveals the importance ofthe timing ofDLC applications as
well. Mission critical problems that threaten the life of the organization are urgent.
Understanding of how short the window of opportunity is to develop a solution for a
crisis, it is easy to see why the majority ofNPD projects are Solve Problem type. The
consequences of improper or no action are far worse than a technical failure technology
adoption project. The majority ofSolve Problem projects were technically successful
on the first or second attempt. Conversely, this would support Proposition #5 that the
length of the development project is related the success of the adoption. The reasons
this holds true for DLC applications are two-fold; first, the strength of the need is not
adequate if a lengthy development program is acceptable and second, the window of
opportunity to find a solution to a crisis does not facilitate development programs.
The third most cited driving factor was Consumer Demand. In cases where the
consumer of the product can communicate a need or a willingness to purchase a product
that delivers unique benefits and superior value, that market opportunity is enough to
drive the adoption. The product manufacturer realizes that if the Consumer Demand is
strong enough and not met that, it will not be long before competition enters the market
to ~swer the need. Pure competition theory states that there are no surplus profits in a
purely competitive market over the long term. This means that competitors will
continue to enter a market until such time as an equilibrium is reached between supply
and demand with the condition that no one competitor is making excess profits.
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Other driving forces that were cited in the interviews to make note of were:
corporate vision; an existing qualified process; need to reduce costs; and a project
champion. Companies that have a corporate vision to be a market leader or to launch a
premium product with a differentiation strategy are very motivated to find a solution
that will provide the benefits they are looking for in a new product. Examples of this
are Company-G and Company-H; where both companies were experiencing pressure
from competition and responded with a corporate wide strategy to become a technology
leader. Both companies needed a product t~at could be differentiated from the
competition, and both companies had strong project champions. Many of the examples
discussed in the qualitative data analysis had multiple driving forces that make it
qifficult to make specific conclusions about one driving force and its effect on product
success. It is not obvious either that combinations of driving forces are required for
success. What is apparent is that at least one driving force noted here is required in any
case for a successful technology adoption, and the more driving forces present the more
likely the adoption will be successful.
The qualitative data set of Commercial Failures had the following top three Red
Flag indicators ofproject failure: 1) the DLC application provided no relative
advantage over competing products; 2) the problem was not critical; and 3) there was a
cheaper alternative solution that was good enough. Relative Advantage is both a strong
indicator of success if the consumer values the additional benefits and it is also an -
indicator that a new product will fail if there are not enough unique benefits.
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Technologies that are complex and expensive require more relative advantage over the
next best alternative solution. Some interviewees described the driving force as,
"DLC has to be the only solution." Dr. Knapp
Even ifDLC is the only solution for a given problem, the problem needs to be mission
critical to the company or else it may be ignored. Several projects passed the Technical
Feasibility phase, but were never commercialized because it was less painful to live
with the problem than to adopt a change. The third most common reason technical
successes failed to be commercialized was.because a cheaper alternative solution
existed. In several cases the act of developing the DLC technology solution led to
incremental improvements in the existing process that resulted in an erosion of the
Relative Advantage ofDLC. A good example of this is the work done for Monsanto on
the spinerette project used to make nylon carpet fiber.
"Through the development process... trying to apply DLC
to the front surface of the spinerette Monsanto made some
changes to the way they do maintenance to their
spinerettes. These revised procedures had enough positive
effect on the equipment up time that the economics of
adopting DLC became an issue and the project was
stopped." Joe Wetherington
An interesting note about spinerettes is that a similar project with another a Monsanto
competitor actually went farther into the development process but also failed to
commercialize because the solution was-not economical. This project supports
)
propositions #1 and #5 that although the problem was annoying, the strength oithe need
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was not enough to drive the adoption. Monsanto's ability to wait three years to develop
the process is also a strong indicator that the problem was not critical and supports the
relationship between the length of the development and the probability of success.
Other Red Flags to watch out for with an application screen are: no project
champion or lack of organization on the project team; no patent protection to prevent
the customer from adopting the technology without paying; and material
incompatibility with the application. In some cases the coating met all the customer
specifications and a decision to launch was reached, but the project failed because the
technology was not the solution to the problem.
CONCLUSIONS
The cumulative knowledge of the organization studied suggests that a profile of
a successful new DLC coating application can be used to manage product development.
Analyzing those· projects that were most successful has provided us with a number of
project characteristics and driving factors that influence the adoption process. However,
it should also be noted here that many ofthese same factors were present in projects that
failed to be commercialized. Therefore, the multi:dimensional market screening model
created cannot be used exclusively to make project selection decisions. The probability
of success, and lack of success are predictable. A more practical application of the
knowledge collected in this study is to create a list ofhurdle questions whose answers
will determine whether or not a project continues on to the next phase ofthe NPD
process, repeats the same phase, or is killed. What is needed for a new product success
...
is a multitude of forces all pulling the NPD at the right time and with the right value
proposition. What determines a commercial failure is far simpler. One wrong criteria
can be the end of a new product concept. It is far easier and more practical to identify
those projects that will not succeed and eliminate them from the pool ofpotential
projects.
Using a model to actively weed out losers from a portfolio of new product
development projects is an effective way to increase the percentage ofnew product
successes. The reason that this is true has to do with the availability qf information
from a customer base that is not public. Industrial customers tend to have a 'closed
door' policy about problems with their products or processes. Having a reputation as
the worldwide leader in diamond coatings and a company that 'Creates High
Performance Solutions Thru Diamond Technologies' [company tag line] takes time to
develop. Word-of-mouth promotion and leveraging existing product successes is the
traditional way to grow a customer base in this field.
As a technology solutions provider, the ability to cut short those projects that do
not have the necessary unique benefits and superior value to a customer to become
. successful greatly increases the efficiency of limited technical resources. In addition,
the reallocation of key technical resources onto those projects that have a high
probability of success will increase the value of the organization. A less direct benefit
to screening out bad applications is related to the development of a firm's technical
•
resources. Moving key technical people off bad applications and onto commercially
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successful projects will result in a higher level of employee satisfaction, which means
higher productivity.
The more compelling the business reasons to launch a new product, the more
likely the technology will be adopted. Compelling business reasons to adopt a
technology from an external source are things like: building a performance edge for a
product differentiation strategy; solving a costly problem with an existing product or
process; enabling a product to jump to the next technology paradigm; avoiding a
potential problem with an existing product; or creating an entirely new product. The
stronger the business reason is perceived within our customer's organization the faster
the technology will diffuse into the organization. External factors influence the
adoption process (Appendix B) but it is the internal driving forces that make the
adoption a success. Once the product has been launched the external driving forces
determine the success of the product and continued adoption or rejection of the
technology.
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
This model is limited by its ability to remain current. As consumer demands
change and products change technology platforms, the influencing factors need to be
updated to keep the model current. The accuracy of the model will depend largely on
the similarities"between the new application and the pastPn:?j~cts that comprise the
model. Certainly there_~~_s9~eg~!1~~al truths about technology adoption that can and
will remain constant. It is safe to say, at least for the next twenty years, that industrial
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customers will usually want more performance for less money. New materials need to
be higher performing and cheaper to displace existing materials. It is because of this
....
that Diamonex spends the majority of its resources on applied research activities to
develop the process technology to reduce costs lor existing and future customers.· If the
model cannot predict product success, how then can it be used to stop a current project?
The best answer to this question begins with a general statement. Models are a tool to
be used to structure a thought exercise that should lead to the correct decision.
Ultimately the decision still remains a matter of subjectivity influenced by past
experiences, current business and market climates, and the intuition of the corporate
leadership.
PROPOSITIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
The benefits from creating and using a tool, such as a market screening model,
are diverse. Theprimary benefit is the topic of this research: the ability to improve the
success rate of new product development. Secondary benefits include a number of
human resource issues: changing the wayan organization views itself and how best to
conduct future business; increasing communication between management and technical
and Sales and Marketing personnel; and increasing confidence in the company.and the
.management's ability to lead the company will grow. Models can provide an objective
tool to evaluate and judge projects to remove some of the political nature of strategic
project selection decisions. Moving technical staff off one project and onto another is
.-. usually viewed as a neg~tive event by th_e..!~chnicClJco~unity._ Y§iQgJh~}ll2.~el !~)._
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give quantitative reasoning behind such decisions can help to keep technical staff
motivated and productive following a reallocation. Increased project success helps
motivate those on and near to the project. A future study topic would be to research the
value placed on commercial successes by technical employees for job satisfaction. A
second topic to investigate would·be the diffusion path that technologies take from one
application to another, for example, h~w DLC diffuses from bar-code scanner windows
to lottery scanner to finger print scanners for ATM machines.
\
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Adoption
Application
Commercial Success
Diffusion Process
DLC
. ..,~
Driving Force
Inertia (change)
NPD
Profile
Red Flag
Shotgun approach
Success
.,
GLOSSARY
a successful technology diffusion into a customer's
product resulting in a new product commercialization.
a possible value added use for diamond coating.
a new product that generates profits.
a process beginning at Diamonex where the benefits of
DLC are communicated from person to person through
the customer organization.
Diamond-Like Carbon is an amorphous hard carbon
material that is so-named because the properties of this
material resemble, but do not duplicate the properties
of diamond. (Appendix D)
An influencing factor that has a positive affect on the
adoption process.
a company's natural inclination to remain the same
New Product Development - a DLC application that
has been funded for development.
a list of driving forces and benefits that are common to
commercially successful DLC products.
a negative influencing factor that by itself can cause a
NPD to fail commercially.
to go after as many projects as possible to increase the
odds ofproducing a commercial new product success.
an active account that has been commercialized.
•
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Example Account Data Sheet - Appendix A
~Dian:aonex'"pE::U='O~CE PROCuC'I'S
,. unn 0' .... 0 ....... 0 CO~Q.ny Process Improvement Team: .. The Process of Product Development"
CUSTOMERIACCOUNT EVALUATION WORKSHEET:
CA~C~co!l.!ullnU.t..l>Gl.!.r,"ou!o!.lJ2ll.Jjlln ...g~·__.; Production :: Workin" prototype C Long-Term Fajlure ~-,O...t>.Uh",e...r _
Customer Name:
Industry I Market:
Locatjon:Citv State
::t.W~a~s.lauMllllarLtk>5e:Lt cA..unLl!.a!,)lv~s.Lljs'-lPLLr~eil...all.rged.L?"": -'::r:..lN"'O"'-"c"'u"'st"'ollm"e"-r.JJinllli"'o-"ownu.;lv:-r Yes DX internal r; Outside service
Primary Contact's position'
Customer's prQduct was used in what applicatiQn'
Assigned to what Depamne:u:
CustQmer's product was in what phase when aCCQunt was staned' r; E:dstin" r In-develQpment r ..J.N.:..:e'-'w'-- _
The applicatiQn was initially driven "championed" by: (please ..~" )
~ Customer Individual 0 Customer Dept. 0 entire Cust. Co. [Diamonex. 0 Unknown [Other _
DX TechnQlQgv chQsen; 0 WRG-DLC C! CYO substrate C! CYO cQated part c: IQn Beam-rnin r;..RE.J~ DiamondShjeld
FunctiQnalitv Qf the CPCD DlC OTHER) technQIQgv desired bv client:
For this application did DiamQnex have a pre-existing qualified process' o...Y§...n NQ aualified prQduct: r:....Y§...~~
What "value - resulting benefit" did the DX enhanced product provide to the client:
iJ Enabling [: Increased perfQrmance 0 Cost ReductiQn [ Market share OOther _
What was the DX bu<iness approach' 0 IQU cQating seryice gEauipment sales ro PrQce~s Licensing r Dx product -: R&D
Date of injtjal contact between DX & custQmer (MQnth I Vear);
How was contact first made? ro DX > Customer r Cu<tomer > DX O~.~3"-r",-d...Lp-,,a,,-,rtv,-,- _
....Is'-t"'h..iswa"'c"'cQ"'u"'nllt...s....ti.l.lU-"a"'c...tj"'"'ve...?~__...:,;:r;~.J.N.:..:o.!.-_.......LlfL..·...J·N""·,,,-o'~'-'w.:.Jhlle"'n"'d...i...d.JJit...,e"'n""d....C.u.m"'Q"".;;yr.l..W.) --' _
!-H"'o"'w:....!"'Q'lln...g-"w""'as"'-"th!!Je"-lo'pru.Ql.l'ie"'c"'r~.......,,...._-y.L.J,;rs'-- __...LM",-O",-,'s'___p.l..rl.lQ"'g:];;..wm.......A,.,c"'tJu·v.JJitv'-'-'l..,e"'v"'el....· r; CQntinuQus r.5hm:LCJ DjscQntinuQus
• _DEVELOPMENT "PHASE REACHED" (please "..J" phase reached ):
G 2. Fe:lsibility· Demonstration
:: 3. Product Development - Optimization
:J 4. Working Prototype - Milestone
Whv did the project stQP? Reason fQr last stage'
o 5. Definition of Product Specification
o 6. Definition of Mfg. Process
[ 7. Final Qualification \ Pre-Production
G 8. VQlume Production
,.O"-rd",e",r...lta",k""'e",n...t!,,,,Q...r .;.:w:.lJh....a....t r...,e"'a~sQ""n"'"· ....;r; ShQn-term revenue ~ Lon"-term revenue C Advance OrtechnQlofV
..rWh'-lllau.tJ;.b",a<..is,,-w.::.sa...s -l<pl.lro/J.i""ec""t..Lr"-ev""e"'n....u =.e...g.=.en"'e...ra.!!.t""e"'d-"oUJn.........· _-i!J,-IPlSe...r .wru.u'nl..-_-,C per feasibj!jtY I deve!Qpmemal program package
Forcasted Revenue if prQductiQn pha<e was Qr had been achieved;
Actual Revenue generated Qver the "cQmplete" history Qfthjs account;
Revenue S I Vr :
Revenue S I HistQry .
'::-,c""Q",m...p""le..,:",e ;:-~r:'.J.n""Q,,"ne,,-- _
Did DX deem the application viable fQr adequate profit margin< in production' :~-: No Would we now? :::.Y§...;11iL
Djd the CUSjQmer prQvjde a written set Qf specificatiQns fQr the DX product:
J"Dl.ijd~wcseJ.m"'es;e;.;.t.lJlhJ.Se'-'c!:.lu..sC!ltQ.LLmJ.Ie!i.lr....!e'"x<l'p'!i.ec;,jts.atujQl/jn..sWfil.\oo!.l..r.lJ1hJJi....s -lIpJ.lr0.u.igeC<it.!.(jllfJ.'N;",!'o~w:!..lh.l,)v~nI.UQL!t.;,.?)L.·__~::_y'-'e..s'-- ~::..lN"'OcL:....-Wh..!.!J.L:.v.;.?·~ _
Were there alternative option< fQr the custQmer; CEcQnQm. TechnQIQgv Qther): Describe:
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Interview List - Appendix C
Name Title Date
1. Dr. Fred Kimock Director ofTechnology (PPG) 2/4/98
2. Leslie Barkley Director of Strategic Business Analysis (PPG) 2/26/98
3. Dr. Brad Knapp Engineering Manager (OPG) 3/6/98
4. Dr. Dave Hoover Vice President of Technology (pPG) 3/27/98
5. Roger Kidwell Salesman (Retired Monsanto/Diamonex) 3/30/98
6. Dr. Fred Kimock Director of Technology (PPG) 4/1/98
7. Ed Thear Business Development Manager, Data Storage 4/2/98
8. Jack Galdieri Vice President of Sales (OPG) 4/8/98
9. Dr. Brian Daniels Fellow (Retired Monsanto/Diamonex) 4/8/98
10. Dr. Dave Brown Engineer (PPG) 4/9/98
11. Dr. Joseph Wetherington President ofDiamonex (OPG) 4/14/98
12. Joe Rogers Business Manager, Protective Coatings (PPG) 4/14/98
13. Larry Johnson Business Manager,Large Area Trans. (PPG) 4/16/98
14. Dr. RolfPetrmichl Research Associate (pPG) 4/17/98
15. Paul Cunningham DLC Technician 4/21/98
16. Dr. Steve Finke Engineering Manager (pPG) 4/19/98
17. Mark Kuhns Controller (PPG) 5/1/98
18. Hill Williams Monsanto 4/27/98
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DLC Material Attributes - Appendix D
PROPERTIES OF DLC A.l\IDP:CD- FILMS
COMPARED TO NATURAL DIAMOND
PROPERTIES DIAMOND POLYCRYSTALLINE DIAMOND-LIKE
DIAMOND CARBON
Microhardness
(kg/mm2) 10,000 8,000-10,000 1,000-5,000
Resistivity
1013_1016 . 101°-1015 104-1012(ohm-em)
Thermal
I_Condo (W/mOK) 2,000 1,300 1-5
Refractive Index I 2.4 _ - I 2.3-2.4 I 1.7-2.4
Density (g/cm3) I 3.5 I 3.2-3.4 I 1.7-2.2
Friction
Coefficient 0.1 0.1 (Polished) < 0.1
Chemical-
Resistance Hiah High Hiah
.... ....
Visible and
Infrared Hiah Hiah High
... ....
Transmission (
Adherence to ,,
Substrate
- Low i HighI
Substrate ~~ .~
Temperature
-
_> 600°C I 20°C-10aoC
u
Film Roughness I - 7 3'f1,m--<O.1:f1m II Smooth .. I
60 1 _
Appendix E
PROPERTY COMBINATIONS
YIELD POTENTIAL·APPLICATIONS
PROPERTY COMBINATIONS APPLICATION
Optical Transparency
Optics
(e.g., Scanner Windows)
Wear/Chemical Protection
-----~ (e.g. "Mold' Coatings)
"Slipperiness"-----...
Reactivity
Hardness
Thermal Conductivity ----
Electrical Resistivity
Thermal Management
(e.g., Heat Spreaders)
Semiconductor
61
Appendix F
• - - - - - REPLACE GLASS
-4WKS
Q INCREASES PRODUCIlVIlY
,Q COST-EffECIlVE REIROm
Q 1DOx's LONGER UFE
TIWI STANDARD
SCANNER GlASS
Q SCRATCH RESiSTANT
Q LOW FRlenON
Q HIGH HARDNESS
Q IMPACT RESISTANT
Q CHEMICALl.Y INERT
In a busy lane of a grocery store
(50,000 Items scanried per week), an
uncoated glass window typically has a
productive lifetime of 4 weeks.
Dlamonex test results Indicate
AEGISGlass· has a hundred times
longer useful life than uncoated scanner
glass. The diamond-like surface can't be
scratched by anything sold in a grocery
store. Less re-scanning means reduced
POS cost and happy customers.
Dlamonex's amorphous diamond-coated
AEGISGlass· can dramatically Improve
the lifetime, read accuracy and read rate
of laser barcode scanners. Windows In
supermarket laser barcode scanners are
sUbject to scratching and scuffing from
metal cans and glass bottles. Scratched
and scuffed windows scatter the laser
light, resulting In poor read accuracy
and read rate.
p'erlorm,E:Poor·~Gocid. ,:l)ery 'Go6d'
-':-.;.," ;:':~.:"'."'.':~ ..: ... ~Il·.•. _:.~.'....-...~ ;:::".C".; ...,;. -.,.
-
==
-
--
--
8YRS '10YRS
20 25
6YRS
15
4YRS
10
.Diamonex'
PERFORMANCE PRODUcrs
AUn< GI.msan:o Company
LIFE (BUSY LN.) 2 YRS
SCANS (MIL.) 5For additional information call:1-800-808-7101
or visit us at:
.www.diamonex;com
7150 Windsor Drive,
Allentown, PA 18106-9328
610-366-7100' FAX: 610-366-7111
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For additional information contact Joseph Rogers at: 610·366·2106,
FAX a request to: 610·366-7144 or visit us at: www.diamonex.com
Chrome
• MedicaVDental
• Metalw~rking
• Textile
• Tools/DieslMolds
• Industrial Wear Parts
Olamcnex
OLe
Hanlne•• (VImrs). DLC VSo nN VI. Chrome
3.000
2,500
2.000
1,500
1,000
500
•Aerospace
•Automotive
• Bearings
• Electronics
• Instrument
Q COl{iWjION l{EjljTMlT
'l Gt\j Ut\l{H]EJ{
~ CONFOHJ'JIJ.\L COMINGj'
7331 William Ave.
Allentown, PA USA
18106
< 0.1 (as·deposlted)
500 'C
.001 ·101lm
1,000-3,000' (adjust)
< 150'C
Inert
10'-10" (ohm-em)
Identical to substrate
PERFORMANCE PRODUcrs
Al.htolLb"arit:l~
Diamonex'
Oiamonex" OLe is a conformal, superhard and low friction coating
of an amorphous form of carbon with diamond bonds. Amorphous
carbon Is a material whose properties resemble, but do not
duplicate, those of natural Diamond.
DJUjjJ0jJHJ@ Wi S) DJUjjJ0mJ.JilJ~H SUJ10jJ S0nl1jJ~j
Low Temperature eVD Plasma &Ion Beam Deposited Thin Film
Coaling Thic!<ness
Friction Coefficient
Max. Working Temp.
Chemical Resistance
Hardness (Vickers)
Deposition Temp.
Coaling Finish
Electrical Resistivity
t~,k\ II a:U.\ iJQ «.,Qaij II.t;i Commercial/Industrial
. DLC Applications
() WE,t\H/ABl{J.\jION HEjjjTMlT
Q LOW FR] CfJ ON
Q HIGH W\iWNEjj
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Q PERFORMANCE
• 50 Acoating passed 60,000 CSS test without failure
OLC
21
2.0
AI20 3-TiC
0-40
0.159
NILADN
22
1.2
AI20 3-TiC
NiFe
Sendust
Ni
Steel
Stainless
0-60
0.165
Angular range (degrees)
Friction (incline plane)
Hardness (GPa)
Stress (GPa)
Adhesion
pull test
(>10kpsi)
Diamonex'
PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS
" AU1l t/ Monsan:o C<>1'I'OnY
7150 Windsor Drive. Allentown, PA 18106·9328
610·366·7100· Fax 610·366·7111
Diamonex will provide NlLADN and DlamonelC' DLC coatings
on customer samples for evaluation.
For more Information contact:
Edward Thear
• Direct Dial 610·366·7127· E.maJl105036.3243@Compuserve.com
Q BENEFITS ;>t~~~M::~,i-:~~;:~~!;:-
• No adhesion layer. rEiglilred on head materials
'::.' ... : :~. C~"-\o~"':i";:tt~~~~\i%~tS4' "i;:-~~~~,::: ~ :.
• Reduced coating thickness·,<'50 'A ~ij;X; "'~
".. ·'I:··.;.~':i:'~~~:'';F#;:{i~'': :.:.~~~,!·.·· ...t ....-;.·· .' .
• Simplifies proce;o;.s b .slon layer
deposltiorj'equipm~.' i:lk:':' •.
""'''.:i';''',j':';'::'''':;;t.~.~.. :-:~"";:. !~.."
• Simplifies quality con rfJ }neasurement as a single material
Q DEPOSITION'~~;!!l~~!! .
• Single grldded DC Ion source for etch and deposition
• Source operation'compatibl~ ~iih' current systems
• RF plasma process under,i:l~velopment
/WZALJT.l/ Coating Properties 8: Characteristics
Q PROPERTIES
"
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LEHIGH UNIVERSITY
MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
Andrew D. Hudson
Andrew D. Hudson was born on January 18, 1970, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Parents are Dr. Howard E. Hudson and Patricia C. Hudson. He graduated high school
in 1988 from William Allen Public High. Graduated with a Bachelors of Science in
Materials Sc~ce and Engineering from the University of Pennsylvania iIi May of
1992.
Following graduation from Penn, Andrew joined Diamonex Incorporated in Allentown
as the 39th employee in a venture capital start-up company. Andrew was hired as a
Systems Engineer and worked his way up to the position of Project Manager. From
February 1996 to the present, he has been part of the Optical Products Group managing
the construction of a class 100 cleanroom and twenty-four thin film vacuum deposition
chambers. . The facility produces a scratch resistant light-weight polycarbonate
ophthalmic lens under the Diamonex brand name.
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